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The basic issue
In the recent past, trade mark litigation has gradually
increased in the High Court of Tanzania (HCT).1 This
litigation includes disputes over registration of trade
marks, applications for temporary injunctions, trade
mark infringement, and passing-off.2 Although I have
classified trade mark litigation into four distinct
groups, more often they tend to overlap in practice.
The analysis in this article is limited to case law on
trade mark infringement because it raises the most crit-
ical legal issues.
The basic legal issue in an action for trade mark in-
fringement is whether a commercial use of a proprie-
tor’s trade mark by a competitor is likely to confuse
consumers. In considering this legal issue, courts in dif-
ferent jurisdictions (eg Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, South
Africa, USA, and the UK) apply the likelihood of con-
fusion test.3 As we shall see, the HCT has rarely consid-
ered this test in its judgments. In one relatively
consistent test, the court has looked at similarity in
trade marks to determine infringement that suggests
that the test provides a high level of protection for
brand owners. However, this test has an adverse conse-
quence for competition in the markets as it creates an
unnecessary monopoly for brand owners. Because of
this, defendant companies have always been ordered to
pay to huge damages and faced injunctions against use
of trade marks in dispute which might have not been
the case if the likelihood of confusion test was applied.
Admittedly, while similarity is one of the factors which
courts have to consider in determining confusion, simi-
larity as such is far from determinative.
Defining trade mark infringement
The Trade and Service Marks Act4 (TMA) does not
define the term trade mark infringement. An attempt
by HCT to define it in Colgate-Palmolive Company has
not provided sufficient guidance. In that case, the court
merely reproduced the wording of section 32 of the
TMA without any further analysis. Likewise, scholars
have found difficult to define trade mark infringement.
Phillips, for example, defines trade mark infringement
in terms of unauthorized uses.5 Re-stating the grounds
for trade mark infringement under European law,
* Email: alex.makulilo@out.ac.tz.
1 According to my search from the Civil Case Register at the HCT, Dar es
Salaam District Registry and Commercial Court Division, at Dar es
Salaam, as well as the Civil Appeal Register at the Court of Appeal of
Tanzania, it is estimated that between 1980 and 2011, some 21 trade
mark cases were decided. Trade mark cases are less common in other
HCT Registries such as Arusha, Dodoma, Tabora, Mbeya, and Mwanza,
probably because most businesses have their headquarters in Dar es
Salaam and suits are instituted where the defendant resides (or is
headquartered), or where a cause of action arose—quite often Dar es
Salaam, where the Trade mark Office is.
2 See eg Kouk Oil and Grains PTE Ltd v Murzah Oil Mill Ltd, Misc. Civil
Reference No 14 of 2002, HCT (Commercial Division), Dar es Salaam
(Unreported), Colgate-Palmolive Company v Zakaria Provision Stores,
Royalex, Al Zameer Enterprises and P& D Agrimech Ltd, Civil Case No 1 of
1997, HCT, Dar es Salaam (unreported); and Agro-Processing and Allied
Products Limited v Said Salim Bhakresa & Co. Limited and Registrar of
Trade and Services Marks, Commercial Case No 31 of 2004, HCT
(Commercial Division), Dar es Salaam (unreported).
3 Likelihood of confusion is the legal standard for assessing whether a
competitor’s trade mark infringes a proprietor’s trade mark. The
application of this test is limited to registered trade marks in this article.
4 Cap, 326 RE 2002.
5 J Phillips, Trade Mark Law: A Practical Anatomy (Oxford University Press
2003) §7.03.
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Phillips explains that trade mark infringement occurs
where identical trade mark is used upon goods or ser-
vices which are the same as those for which the trade
mark is registered. Infringement may also occur where
an identical mark is used for similar goods or services,
a similar mark for the same goods or services, or a
similar mark for similar goods or services, where in
each case there exists a likelihood of confusion on the
part of consumers. Also, infringement occurs where
there is a use of an identical or similar trade mark on
goods or services which are quite different from those
for which the trade mark is registered. Finally, infringe-
ment may occur in well-known trade marks when used
to represent a connection between the user and trade
mark owner which damages the proprietor’s interest. It
can be submitted that the grounds on which trade
mark infringement under EU law is based are all
covered in section 32 of TMA, making European case
law persuasive authority for the Tanzanian courts.
Legal standards for protection of
registered trade marks
Registered trade marks are protected against infringe-
ment by sections 31 and 32 of the TMA. Section 31
vests exclusive rights in the proprietor of a registered
trade mark, while section 32 of TMA protects such ex-
clusive rights against infringement.
Section 31 of the TMA
Section 31 of the TMA grants an exclusive right to the
proprietor to use or authorize others to use such trade
marks in relation to goods or services. This exclusive
right accrues only when a proprietor has fulfilled the
requirements of sections 16–20 of the TMA which
relate to registration requirements. The most important
of these requirements is that a trade mark can only be
registered if it is distinctive.
The exclusive right referred to in section 31 is not
absolute, being subject to other provisions of TMA and
limitations or conditions entered in the register of
trade marks. Examples of such limitations and condi-
tions include fair use under section 34(b) of TMA.
Besides fair use, a proprietor of trade mark may also
assign, transmit, or license their trade mark to third
parties. In each of these cases, the proprietor’s exclusive
right becomes divisible.
Apart from those express limitations and conditions
provided in TMA, the exclusive right in section 31 of
TMA is also limited to the general function and
purpose of trade marks: protecting a trade mark as a
badge of origin. Consequently, the exclusive right in
TMA is not supposed to be interpreted so widely to
give greater protection to proprietors of trade marks
than that which is necessary for attaining the purpose
of trade mark registration.6 This is because registration
of a mark creates only a presumption that it is legitim-
ate and eligible for protection under TMA7 and
nothing more.
Section 32 of the TMA
Section 32 protects the exclusive right granted in
section 31 against infringements. It essentially prohi-
bits someone who is not a proprietor of a trade
mark or its registered user from using a mark which
is identical or which resembles the proprietor’s trade
mark for good or services which are closely related.
The logic behind this prohibition is to protect con-
sumers against likelihood of confusion to identity of
goods or services in the market and at the same
time protect the distinctive character or acquired
reputation of the trade mark. Its text reads, in full,
as follows:
The exclusive right referred to section 31 shall be deemed
to be infringed by any person who, not being the propri-
etor of a trade mark or its registered user using it by way
of the permitted use, uses a sign either:
(a) identical with or so nearly resembling it as to be likely
to deceive or cause confusion, in the course of trade or
business, in relation to any goods in respect of which it is
registered or in relation to any closely related goods and in
such manner as to render the use of the sign likely to be
either:
(i) as being used as a trade mark or business or company
name; or
(ii) in case in which the use is upon the goods or in phys-
ical relation to them, or in relation to services, or in an ad-
vertising circular or other advertisement issued to the
public, as importing a reference to some person having the
right either as proprietor or as a registered user to use the
trade marks or to goods or services with that person is
connected in the course of business or trade; or
6 See Verimark (Pty) Ltd v BMW AG [2007] SCA 53 (RSA) p 5, which,
being a foreign judgment in Tanzania, provides a persuasive
interpretation of s 31 of TMA.
7 Under s 50(1) of the TMA, a valid registration is deemed ‘prima facie’
evidence of the ‘ownership’ prong of the infringement test; this
presumption can also be found in Art 16(1) of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 1994.
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(b) identical with or nearly resembling it in the course of
trade or business in any manner likely to impair the dis-
tinctive character or acquired reputation of the trade
mark.
From section 32 of the TMA, a trade mark infringe-
ment may exist where a plaintiff successfully establishes
three elements cumulatively. First, a plaintiff must es-
tablish that the defendant’s trade mark is either identi-
cal or similar to his or her trade mark. Second, he or
she must establish that the defendant’s goods or ser-
vices upon which the trade mark has been applied is
either identical or similar. Finally, a plaintiff must es-
tablish if such use of the defendant’s similar or identi-
cal trade mark to the said goods or services is likely to
cause confusion to consumers as to the choice of the
products they intended to purchase. In practice, if
trade marks are identical and have been used in rela-
tion to identical goods or services, likelihood of confu-
sion is always presumed. The rationale for this is that it
is natural for human beings to confuse identical
objects, images, etc.
Having set out the legal provisions which protect
trade marks against infringement, we now examine the
jurisprudence of the High Court of Tanzania.
HCT jurisprudence on trade mark
infringement
Identical or similar trade marks
Legal issues
A close analysis of HCT case law reveals that the court
has persistently framed legal issues incorrectly in deter-
mining identity or similarity between trade marks. In
Colgate Palmolive, the court framed an issue whether
the mark and getup used for ABC Dent toothpaste was
identical, or confusingly similar to that used for
Colgate toothpaste.8 The catch words from this issue
are identical and confusingly similar. Surprisingly, the
court abandoned discussion of these basic legal con-
cepts. Instead, it proceeded to discuss a different issue:
whether the two trade marks were similar. It is arguable
that the terminologies of identical and confusingly
similar neither individually nor collectively mean
similarity. A mark may only be considered to be identi-
cal to another if it reproduces, without any modifica-
tion or addition, all the elements constituting the trade
mark or where, viewed as a whole, it contains differ-
ences so insignificant that they may go unnoticed by
the average consumer.9 At the same time, the term con-
fusingly similar can never refer to similarity as such but
to the legal standard required to prove infringement, ie
likelihood of confusion.10
Although it is settled law that, where a court frames
an incorrect issue but the judgment gives a correct
finding, such an irregularity does not result in an il-
legality,11 it is still arguable that where technical terms
are involved in framing issues it is unlikely that the
court will arrive at a correct finding. This view can well
be supported by the court’s finding in Colgate Palmolive
where the totality of evidence adduced by the plaintiff
clearly established that there were striking similarities
in the two getups. Having found that, the court con-
cluded that the criteria of being identical or confusingly
similar were affirmatively answered. However, on a
closer analysis, the court’s finding does not provide any
meaningful answer to the issue framed. The conclusion
that the trade marks in dispute were similar is not the
same issue raised by the court. It is submitted that the
court’s improper use of basic legal concepts in framing
legal issues resulted in incorrect findings.
The HCT has also tended to fuse distinct legal issues
into one. In Sabuni Detergents Limited v Murzah Oil
Mils Limited,12 the HCT had to consider whether the
two trade marks in question were so similar as to cause
confusion to consumers. The court adopted a similar
approach in Agro-Processing and Allied Products
Limited13 where trade marks SSB Ngano POA, SSB
Unga POA, and SSB Sembe POA were in dispute.14
Since similarity addresses a comparison of the marks
themselves, while likelihood of confusion addresses the
consequence of similarity, each of these concepts is
determined using a different legal standard. And where
distinct legal issues are fused together, there is a real
danger that the court may not determine the issue in
its entirety. This is illustrated in the case of Sabuni
Detergents, where the court left undetermined the issue
whether similarity in marks was likely to cause confu-
sion to consumers. An attempt to consider the former
8 n 2, above, p 3.
9 LTJ Diffusion SA v Vertbaudet SA, C-291/00, European Court of Justice.
10 The terms ‘confusingly similar’ and ‘likelihood of confusion’ both refer to
the standard required to prove infringement of a trade mark, http://
marklaw.com/trade mark-glossary/confuse.htm (accessed on
20 November 2010).
11 BM Prasad, Mulla, Code of Civil Procedure (17th edn, vol 2, LexisNexis,
New Delhi 2007) 722.
12 Commercial Case No 256 of 2001, HCT (Commercial Division), Dar es
Salaam (unreported), p 3.
13 n 2, above, p 7.
14 The words ‘ngano’ and ‘sembe’ translate in English as ‘wheat flour’ and
‘maize flour’, respectively.
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was made in Agro-Processing and Allied Products.
However, the court’s analysis to this question is not
thorough and remains obscure.15
HCT case law also demonstrates frequent problems
of duplication of legal issues. This is probably because
of HCT’s misconception of various terminologies. In
Sabuni Detergents, for example, the court raised the
issue of whether the two trade marks were so similar as
to cause confusion to consumers.16 At the same time, it
framed another issue: was there any infringement of
the plaintiff ’s trade mark?17 It is arguable that the
second issue is a repetition of the second limb of the
first issue unless the defendant raised the defence of
authorized use of the brand or any other defence.18 In
Sabuni Detergents that defence was not raised, so it was
unnecessary for the court to consider it. Where there is
duplicity, the court wastes time by reconsidering the
same legal issues. Also, the court has often found itself
engaging in conflicting analysis and opinion regarding
the same issues, making its jurisprudence more confus-
ing. This view is supported by the court’s findings in
Sabuni Detergents, as follows:
Issue 1: whether the trade marks are similar so as to cause
confusion to consumers. The judge observed, ‘Both gentle-
men assessors’ views are in the affirmative. I do concur
with them. We had the opportunity and privilege of being
presented with Exh. P2. It leaves no doubt that the two
packages resemble and likely to cause confusion to consu-
mers. I do agree with PW2 that in soap business the pack-
aging has its influence on consumers. Both the plaintiff
and PW3 never dealt in retail soap trade, selling bars of
soap. Instead, they sold their product (sic) in wholesale or
semi wholesale hence their goods were sold in cartons.
That already created confusion and as narrated by PW3.
Therefore all the foregoing considered, my view is that the
two trade marks as depicted in Exh. P2 did cause confu-
sion to consumers.’
Issue 6: Was there then an infringement of the plaintiff ’s
trade mark? The judge said, ‘That was the nitty gritty issue
of this case. Both gentlemen assessors believe so. So do I.
It is uncontravarted (sic) evidence of the plaintiff ’s case
that they (sic) registered their product in June, 2000 and
started production of their product soon thereafter. The
defendant’s product came on market in late 2001. All the
above considered it leads me to the inescapable conclusion
that the answer to issue No. 6 is in the affirmative. There
was an infringement. The defendant did infringe the
FOMA LIMAO trade mark No. 28080 by passing off its
product.’
It appears from these two paragraphs that there is a
failure by the court to relate the findings of consumer
confusion in issue 1 and infringement in issue 6. As
there was no defence of authorized use by the defend-
ant or such other defence as pointed above, the court
was supposed to conclude its analyses on infringement
in issue 1. Instead, the court misplaced several princi-
ples. First, its analysis in issue 1 is based on similarity
in goods as opposed to priority of registration in issue 6.
Secondly, although the conclusion in issue 1 seems to
relate to those in issue 6, it was erroneous for the court
to find infringement on the basis of priority of registra-
tion of dates of the contested trade marks. Thirdly, the
HCT also found that the defendant had passed-off the
plaintiff ’s products. Again, this was a misdirection as
issue 6 was not framed around passing-off. It was
therefore strange for the court to arrive at a conclusion
without consideration of it. A plausible approach in
framing issues was taken by HCT in Glaxo Group
Limited v Agri-Vet Limited.19 In that case, the court
correctly framed distinct legal issues in their own
right.20
Assessment of identicalness or similarity in trade
marks
HCT case law demonstrates divergent tests in deter-
mining whether two trade marks are identical or
similar. These tests are the side-by-side comparison and
the global appreciation approach. In the first test, the
court displays the contested trade marks side by side
and examines and compares their features. In this exer-
cise, the court notes their dominant features, compares
and differentiates them. If it is found that the elements
of a later trade mark are exactly or almost the same as
those in an earlier trade mark, the contested trade
marks are identical. However, if the elements of a later
trade mark look like those in an earlier trade mark but
are not exactly the same, then the two trade marks are
similar. In contrast, in the global appreciation approach,
the court takes into account all the relevant factors.21
15 In his finding, the judge simply concluded that, since the defendant’s
trade marks were similar to the plaintiff ’s, the former resulted in
confusing of consumers. More analysis of this finding will be considered
below.
16 Issue no 1, p 3, n 20, below.
17 ibid, issue no 6.
18 Similar issues which are sometimes raised by the HCT with regard to an
act of trade mark infringement are (i) whether trade marks X and Y are
so similar as to cause confusion, (ii) whether trade marks X and Y are
confusingly similar, or (iii) whether there is likelihood of confusion
between trade marks X and Y.
19 Commercial Case No 73 of 2002, HCT (Commercial Division), Dar es
Salaam (Unreported), p 2.
20 ibid, issues 1 and 2.
21 The frequently cited case for the global appreciation approach is Sabel v
Puma where the European Court of Justice stated: ‘The comparison of
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With this test, the court considers the nature of the
trade marks involved in a dispute. If, for example, the
trade marks involved are only graphics, only visual
comparison is relevant. On the other hand, if the con-
flicting trade marks are capable of being spoken, aural
comparison becomes relevant. And, when word trade
marks are involved, it is conceptual similarity which is
relevant. Sometimes, there may be a combination of
words and graphics. In this case, comparison is made
between two marks, taking into account particularly of
the features which are memorable. The rationale
behind the global appreciation test is that the average
consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and
does not proceed to analyse its various details.
Early HCT case law indicates that it had always
invoked the global appreciation test. The landmark case
here is Colgate-Palmolive where the court as per Mapi-
gano, J stated, ‘and that what is necessary is to
compare the whole of the defendant’s mark and get up
to see whether there are similarities which go to create
or show prospects of confusion and actual deception’.22
This principle was restated in Tanzania Breweries Ltd v
Kenya Breweries Ltd23 where the court stated that when
looking at trade marks in light of complaints of in-
fringement so as to establish similarities, the whole of
the plaintiff ’s mark and the whole of the defendant’s
mark and not only a particular feature has to be com-
pared no matter how prominent. However, in recent
case law, there is a noticeable shift from the global ap-
preciation test to the side-by-side comparison. For
example, in Glaxo Group Ltd 24 counsel for each party
sought to analyse the details of the trade marks in
dispute. The judge endorsed that approach. However, it
is submitted that the side-by-side comparison test fails
to reflect consumers’ eyes in purchasing product in
relevant markets. This is because the products intended
to be purchased may not necessarily be found side by
side. Moreover, customers who have been purchasing
particular products for some time may not spend time
comparing and contrasting features of the trade marks
in question even when such products are found side by
side in relevant markets. In contrast, the global appreci-
ation approach is closer to the consumers’ practice in
purchasing products in relevant markets. This is
because consumers normally look at the products in
overall terms (their colours, structure, etc) rather than
concentrating on a specific feature regardless of its
prominence.
Identical or similar goods or services
Legal issues
The issue whether goods or services are identical or
similar has never been considered in HCT case law.
Undoubtedly, this omission has undermined the devel-
opment of the court’s jurisprudence because the degree
of similarity between the marks and the goods or ser-
vices are interdependent in deciding whether there is
likelihood of confusion. Accordingly, a lesser degree of
similarity between goods or services may be offset by a
greater degree of similarity between marks, and vice
versa. Yet this symbiotic effect has been ignored by the
court making its jurisprudence hollow.
Assessment of identity or similarity in goods
or services
An attempt by the court to compare goods in Agro-
Processing and Allied Products was fruitless, since the
court formed an opinion that there was no dispute that
the plaintiff and defendant were both carrying on
similar businesses concerning of maize and wheat
flour.25 Regrettably, this opinion lacked thorough ana-
lysis. Since trade marks are registered so that they can
be applied on goods or services to indicate their origin,
it is necessary that an assessment as to whether the
goods or services are identical or similar is carried out.
Perhaps the starting point for HCT in comparing
goods or services could be the International (Nice)
Classification system.26 However, reference to this clas-
sification is sometimes not conclusive in itself because
similar goods or services may be classified in different
classes while dissimilar goods or services may fall
within the same class. This is due to the fact that,
under the Nice Classification the range of goods or ser-
vices covered by each class is very wide.27 Specifications
must accordingly be read with caution. Given the lim-
trade marks should involve a global appreciation of the visual, aural or
conceptual similarity of the marks in question, bearing in mind, in
particular, their distinctive and dominant components.’
22 n 2, above, p 3.
23 Civil Case No 34 of 1999, HCT at Dar es Salaam (Unreported).
24 n 19, above, pp 2–6.
25 According to the court the fact that the two companies were selling wheat
and maize flour was sufficient to find similarity in goods. However, the
court did not go further to consider the different ways such wheat and
maize flour were packed and put into channel of markets.
26 In Tanzania, trade and service marks are registered in respect of
particular goods or services in one or more classes of International
Classification and any question arising as to which class any goods or
services fall is determined by the Registrar: see s 15 of the Trade and
Service Marks Act, Cap 326 RE 2002.
27 Rhone Poulenc v Reckitt Benkiser WTLR, 18 July 2003 (Colombian Trade
Mark Office), cited in J Phillips, Trade Mark Law: A Practical Anatomy
(Oxford University Press 2003) 334.
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itations of the Nice Classification, courts in different
jurisdictions have developed other ways of comparing
goods or services. It is now settled that, in comparing
goods or services, there is no single decisive test.
However, courts have to take into account a broad
range of factors. These include, but are not limited to,
the nature and characteristics of the goods or services,
their origin, their purpose, whether they are usually
produced by one and the same manufacturer or distrib-
uted by the same wholesale houses, whether they are
sold in the same shops over the same counters during
the same seasons and to the same class or classes of
customers, and whether by those engaged in their
manufacture and distribution they are regarded as
belonging to the same trade.28 This is what HCT has to
consider in its analyses.
Likelihood of confusion to consumers
Legal issues
HCT has developed two ways of framing issues on con-
sumer’s confusion and trade mark infringement. The
first is whether trade marks are sufficiently similar as to
cause confusion. The other is whether there is trade
mark infringement. The two questions are distinct. Yet,
when the defendant raises no defence against infringe-
ment, the second question becomes redundant.
Assessment of the likelihood of confusion
Analysis of the case law developed by HCT shows that
the court has scarcely engaged this test in order to
assess infringement. Instead, that court has always used
similarity in trade marks to determine infringement. In
Colgate Palmolive, the plaintiff sued the defendant for
trade mark infringement and passing-off of its Colgate
products by importing in Tanzania and distributing
ABC Dent products whose general make-up, colour
marking and appearance of the tube, and package
resembled closely the plaintiff ’s product. In hearing the
case, the HCT listed seven issues. Although some of the
issues may not be relevant to the present assessment, I
reproduce them verbatim to give a broader picture of
the court’s jurisprudence:
1. Whether ABC Dent is a registered mark and whether
the defendants are registered users of the mark in
terms of section 31 of Trade and Service Marks Act
No 12 of 1986.
2. Whether the defendants are at law concurrent users
of an identical or similar mark in terms of section
20(2) of Trade and Service Marks Act No 2 of 1986.
3. Whether the plaintiff by its conduct can be said to
have acquiesced of the infringement by allowing the
defendant’s product to circulate freely before they
filed the suit in 1997.
4. Whether the mark and getup used for ABC Dent
toothpaste is identical, or confusingly similar, to that
used for Colgate toothpaste.
5. Whether or not there is an infringement of the
plaintiff ’s registered trade mark.
6. Whether in a case of trade mark infringement and
passing off the plaintiff needs to prove actual confu-
sion or deception.
7. Whether by reason of the defendants conduct, plain-
tiff has suffered financial loss and is entitled to the
reliefs sought.
As can be noted, issues 4 and 5 were poorly framed,
since ‘confusingly similar’ is the test of infringement.
Issue 6 could be considered alongside issue 5 because it
relates to the manner of proving infringement. While
the court omitted to frame an issue on passing-off, at
page 13 of the judgment it asserted that the plaintiff
had successfully established its claims in both trade
mark infringement and passing-off. This was wrong
since the court did not determine at all the claims for
passing-off. Issues 1, 2, and 3 were properly framed
since they were raised in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the
defendant’s written statement of defence. Issue 7
reflects the relief claimed by the plaintiff.
With respect to the claims of trade mark infringe-
ment in issue 5, HCT found that:
. . . there is no dispute that plaintiff is a registered owner of
Colgate toothpaste trade mark. This fact is buttressed by
the respective certificate of registration produced as Exh
P1. Because of this registration plaintiff ’s trade mark is
protected under section 31 against infringement. The term
trade mark infringement as defined in section 32(1)
includes use of unregistered trade mark identical or so
nearly resembling it as to be likely to deceive or cause con-
fusion in the trade or business. This is exactly what the
defendants have done. I am convinced, in answer to the
fifth issue, that there is an infringement of the plaintiff ’s
registered trade mark.29
In Sabuni Detergents, eight issues were considered by
the HCT. Issues 1 and 6 related to trade mark infringe-
ment. Issue 1 stated, ‘whether the two trade marks are
28 Jallinek’s Application (1946) 63 RPC 59. 29 n 2, above, p 11.
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so similar as to cause confusion to consumers’. Issue 6
stated, ‘is there any infringement of the plaintiff ’s trade
mark?’ Problems with formulation of the two issues
have already been considered above.
While the above issues 1 and 6 are almost the same
in their effect as there was a defence raised by the de-
fendant as to authorization of use, for example, HCT
responded to them differently. With respect to issue 1,
after the court had found that the contested trade
marks were similar, it concluded that such similarity
created confusion to consumers.30 However, in
responding affirmatively to issue 6, the court took into
account similarities in the trade marks as well as prior-
ity date of plaintiff ’s registration of trade mark.
Consistently, with the decisions cited above, in
Glaxo Group Limited the judge stated:
The similarities in the get-up in exhibits P2 and P4 have
come up clearly. The provisions of sections 31 and 32 give
the plaintiff protection against infringement. The plaintiff
is also given the exclusive right to use the trade mark as
provided for under section 31 of the Act. The case of
Palmolive supra which I fully support expounds what con-
stitutes acts of infringement. The similarities in exhibits P2
and P4 leave no doubt that the defendant copied and imi-
tated the plaintiff ’s trade mark and get-up. That amounts
to infringement of the plaintiff ’s registered trade mark
COFTA as per sections 31 and 32 of the Act.31
Agro-Processing and Allied Products is the most recent
judgment to consider trade mark infringement in Tan-
zania.32 Although this case was filed in 2004, judgment
was delivered on December 2008. In this case, the
court framed the following issue, ‘whether the defend-
ants’ intended marks SSB Ngano POA, SSB Unga Poa
are nearly similar to the plaintiff ’s mark “POA” likely
to deceive or cause confusion hence infringing the
plaintiff ’s trade mark.’ In answering this issue, the
court held, ‘from the above it is clear that the defend-
ant’s intended trade marks are similar to the plaintiff ’s
mark as a result it causes confusion. Since the defend-
ant adopted that trade mark it infringes the rights of
the plaintiff.’
As can be seen, HCT has at all times considered
similarity in trade marks as a conclusive determinant
factor for trade mark infringement. However, since
similarity as such cannot lead to a finding of trade
mark infringement, the court ought to have considered
the effect of such similarity on consumers’ ability to
identify products they intend to purchase from the
market. This calls for the engagement of the likelihood
of confusion test.
An attempt to use the likelihood of confusion test
was made by HCT in Colgate Palmolive (a decision
which was principally focused on the preliminary in-
junction issue).33 In finding for the plaintiff, the court
held that, in order to determine whether consumers are
likely to be confused by similar trade marks, the plain-
tiff has to establish that a substantial number of custo-
mers of average intelligence with imperfect recollection
will probably be confused as to the origin of the
defendants’ goods or the existence (or lack of it) of a
connection between the defendants’ goods and the
goods of the plaintiff.34 It is unfortunate that the
court’s ruling failed to shed sufficient light on the ap-
plication of this principle. Accordingly, the court ended
finding infringement on the basis of mere similarity of
trade marks. The most controversial decision in the
jurisprudence of the HCT was Tanzania Breweries (a
decision which was also principally focused on the
issue of preliminary injunctive relief).35 There the
court rejected the legal test for likelihood of confusion
laid down in Colgate Palmolive. In contrast to Colgate
Palmolive where the court held that the yardstick for
likelihood of confusion is a consumer of average intelli-
gence with imperfect recollection, in Tanzania Brewer-
ies, the court held:
in drawing its conclusion, the court has to wear the shoes
of a common man, spread the two marks before it and ask
itself whether there are resemblances between the two
which would make it pick a product which was not
intended but the opposite. Applying this test to the plain-
30 n 12, above, pp 6 and 7.
31 n 19, above, p 10.
32 Between December 2008 and September 2011, only three trade mark
cases were filed in the HCT and the Court of Appeal of Tanzania. The
first was Said Salim Bakhresa & Co. Ltd v Agro-Processing and Allied
Products Ltd and Registrar of Trade and Service Marks, Civil Appeal No 55
of 2009, Court of Appeal of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam (unreported). This
appeal originated from Agro-Processing and Allied Products, Commercial
Case No 31 of 2004, HCT. The appeal in Said Salim Bakhresa was struck
out in August 2010 by the Court of Appeal of Tanzania for lack of
competence as the record of appeal contained a defective decree. The
second case is Bata Brands s.a.v.i v Bora Industries Ltd, Commercial Case
No 12 of 2010, HCT (Commercial Division), Dar es Salaam. This case
has been adjourned indefinitely. The third, IPP Media v Price Bagenda,
Commercial Case No 20 of 2009, HCT (Commercial Division), Dar es
Salaam, is still pending.
33 Makulilo, A.B., ‘Trade marks in Tanzania: the prima facie case and
interim relief ’, Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 2010,
Vol.5, No.8, p.571.
34 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) considered this principle for which
trade marks are compared in the leading case of SABEL BV v Puma AG,
Rudolf Dassler Sport C-251/95 (1998) ETMR 1. In this case, the ECJ held
that the comparison of trade marks should involve a global appreciation
of visual, aural, or conceptual similarity of the marks in question bearing
in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components.
35 n 33, above.
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tiff ’s application for temporary injunction, the judge made
the following finding, ‘I have carefully put myself in the
shoes of a common beer consumer and subjected my eyes to
the contested trade marks. At the end of this exercise I
have concluded that notwithstanding the presence of
“Kibo peak” on all brands there is no way the deception to
the degree complained of by the Applicant.’
The court rejected the plaintiff ’s argument that, in de-
ciding whether the resemblance between the marks is
capable of confusion or deception in the beer trade, the
yardstick used is that of a consumer of beer of average
intelligence and with imperfect recollection.36 The rea-
soning of the HCT was that here one deals with an in-
creasingly poor recollection in an ordinary person with
the progressive consumption of the product, while the
court was suggesting that the recollection of a con-
sumer must be perfect. It likened the plaintiff ’s argu-
ment to putting an insane or drunken person behind
the steering wheel of a motor vehicle and expecting
him to abide by the traffic rules. The court concluded:
‘the person we have in mind here is nobody else but an
ordinary person capable of digesting resemblances, simi-
larities and the like’. However, in Tanzania Breweries,
the HCT failed to analyse systematically the terms
common man, common beer consumer, and ordinary
person.
Still obscure
As the preceding HCT case law has demonstrated, the
jurisprudence of trade mark infringement in Tanzania
remains obscure. The court has failed to apply the likeli-
hood of confusion test in determining trade mark in-
fringement. In all cases, HCT has found infringement
on mere similarity in trade marks. In some instances,
the court has gone far to consider priority of registration
as a criterion for assessing trade mark infringement. An
attempt by the court to engage the likelihood of confu-
sion is noticed in Colgate Palmolive and Tanzania Brew-
eries (the likelihood of confusion test was incorrectly
brought into application by HCT during consideration
of a temporary injunction). The rulings in these two
cases do not explicitly explain how to apply the test.
36 The plaintiff ’s argument was based on Colgate Palmolive.
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